Abstract: The paper analyzes the social discount rate under uncertainty. It employs a preference representation that enriches the characterization of uncertainty by a degree of confidence into probabilistic descriptions of the world. Special cases of the model comprise discounting under smooth ambiguity aversion as well as discounting under a disentanglement of risk aversion and aversion to intertemporal substitution. I relate different results in the literature switching risk measures between the classical Arrow Pratt form and a measure of intertemporal risk aversion. I characterize the general class of preferences for which uncertainty implies a reduction of the social discount rate. I also characterize the class of preferences that lower the discount rate compared to the standard model. I derive a particular parametric discounting formula under the assumptions of isoelastic preferences and normal growth rates. Apart from the usual characteristics of the growth process like expected value and variance, the discount rate depends on a measure of confidence into future growth estimates and a measure of aversion to the lack of confidence. JEL Codes: D61, Q54, D81, D90
Introduction
How does uncertainty about the future affect optimality of projects? Uncertainty about economic growth and other variables affect society's social discount rate. This rate is highly relevant for the evaluation of long-term projects including climate change related mitigation and adaptation projects, investments in basic research, national defense, infrastructure projects, projects involving biodiversity loss, and a long-term energy strategy including the appraisal of nuclear energy and waste. At the agent's level, the consumption discount rate analogously determines intertemporal trade-offs and precautionary saving. The paper presents a new model for the social (or consumption) discount rate under uncertainty. The model unifies and generalizes a variety of previously derived discounting formulas. One of the main results is a general statement when the social discount rate decreases in the face of uncertainty. Uncertainty incorporates risk, ambiguity, and a more general form of confidence labeled beliefs. As a parametric special case, the paper develops a simple extension of the stochastic Ramsey equation that incorporates general aversion to objective risk, a confidence measure for non-objective beliefs, and an aversion parameter to the lack of confidence.
From Leland (1968) we learned that a decision maker should increase his savings for the future under uncertainty, if his (absolute) Arrow-Pratt risk aversion decreases in wealth. In Leland's (1968) analysis Arrow-Pratt risk aversion simultaneously characterizes aversion to intertemporal substitution. Gollier (2002) disentangled risk aversion from the propensity to smooth consumption over time. He showed that Leland's reasoning still goes through and a decision maker reduces the social discount rate in the face of uncertainty if the, now disentangled, measure of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion falls in wealth. Recently, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) contrast these findings with a model of ambiguity. They show in Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji's (2005) model of smooth ambiguity aversion that a decreasing coefficient of absolute ambiguity aversion is not sufficient to ensure a reduction of the discount rate in the face of uncertainty. The authors identify a 'prudence term' that does lower the discount rate under uncertainty if absolute ambiguity aversion is falling. However, they also identify a 'pessimism term' whose response to uncertainty can only be determined by restricting the admissible lottery domain. In the current paper, I reconcile Gierlinger & Gollier's (2008) finding with the earlier results in the literature and reconstitute Leland's (1968) insight regarding the effect of decreasing aversion on the discount rate for the general setting, including that of smooth ambiguity aversion. I track differences in the results to differences in the employed uncertainty measure. An appropriate change in risk measure can introduce the 'pessimism effect' in the original risk setting or eliminate it from the ambiguity setting. Moreover, I derive a proposition that compares the uncertainty effect on the social discount rate between various models of generalized uncertainty and the intertemporally additive expected utility standard model. The generalized uncertainty framework builds on Traeger (2010) and incorporates as special cases the model based on Kreps & Porteus (1978) , Epstein & Zin (1989) , and Weil (1990) disentangling risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability and the model of smooth ambiguity aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji (2009) . Limiting cases of the model also include the Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) criterion for decision making under ignorance and Gilboa & Schmeidler's (1989) maximin expected utility. The general framework employs multilayer probabilistic beliefs that are indexed by a confidence measure. In particular, the setting permits to model a decision maker who employs all (or any combination) of the above decision criteria conditional on the confidence in his description of the uncertainty he faces.
Ever since Keynes (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) economists and decision theorists have expressed their concern that a standard probability distribution cannot capture uncertainty comprehensively. Some probability distributions are derived from long time series and frequent observations, while others are merely guesstimates. Consider two mutually exclusive events. In absence of any information on the likelihood of these events, the principle of insufficient reason guides the decision maker to employ equal probabilities. At the same time, the flip of a fair coin is described by equal probabilities on heads and tails. Yet, in the first situation the decision maker's guess is based on complete ignorance, while in the second situation he faces well known objective probabilities. Both uncertainties differ in a dimension that is not captured by the probability distributions themselves. It is a measure of confidence (or of subjectivity) that distinguishes the two. Experiments based on the famous Ellsberg (1961) paradox have shown that, indeed, people often act differently depending in on their degree of confidence into a probability distribution. Decision theorists have explored this concern in depth over the last two decades. I build on a recent extension of the widespread smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff, Marinacci, & Mukerji 2005 , 2009 ) by Traeger (2010) . The latter analysis extends the classical von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) axioms, underlying the expected utility model, to a setting where lotteries are distinguished by their degree of confidence. In the current paper, I apply Traeger's (2010) framework to derive a discounting formula that takes into account not just the riskiness of future payoffs, but also the degree of confidence into the probability distributions employed to describe the uncertainties.
A comparable distinction of different types of uncertainty has reached the applied policy arena in a field where recent research has proven the primordial importance of selecting the right discount rate. The guidance notes of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AR4) ask the lead authors to distinguish between three different types of uncertainty: "unpredictability", "structural uncertainty", and "value uncertainty". However, the subsequent economic assessment is not, yet, able to incorporate these distinctions. In recent work, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) and Traeger (2009) apply the smooth ambiguity framework by Klibanoff et al (2005 Klibanoff et al ( ,2009 ) to models of social discounting. These models, however, can only capture two types of uncertainty: objective versus subjective uncertainty. In real world applications, purely objective probabilities are rare and the degree of subjectivity of, or informedness of, or confidence in a probability distribution varies widely. The current paper suggests a framework in which decision makers, or climate scientists, base their uncertainty evaluation not only on probabilistic estimates of future uncertainty, but also on the informedness of the probabilistic description. It translates both of these informations into the social (or consumption) discount rate. The adopted preference framework builds on a behaviorally as well as normatively attractive set of axioms that preserve time consistency and a minimally modified version of von Neumann-Morgenstern's independence axiom. In difference to Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) , the framework also keeps separate what is distinct: it distinguishes between the desire to smooth consumption over time and the (various degrees of) uncertainty aversion, as is suggested by the recent finance literature explaining the equity premium and the risk free rate puzzles (Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio 2003 , Basal & Yaron 2004 , Basal, Kiku & Yaron 2010 .
Background and Representation
Current consumption is certain and denoted by x 0 . I will employ a unidimensional notation u ′ (x 0 ) for derivatives. However, outcomes can also be multidimensional or elements of a compact metric continuously differentiable manifold unless stated otherwise. For the general case u ′ (x 0 ) is short for ∂ α 0 u(x 0 ), denoting the directional derivative along consumption change α at consumption point x 0 .
1 The decision maker considers investing a (marginal) unit of a good into a productive project that pays one unit plus the yearly (average) interest r in the future. The minimal interest required to make the agent invest into the project is the (risk free) social discount rate or consumption discount rate. Under certainty it is characterized by the pure rate of time preference δ and the ratio of marginal utilities in the future and in the present:
where x T denotes future consumption. Note that, in the one dimensional setting, the curvature of u characterizes the desire to smooth consumption over time. This paper derives the modifications of equation (1) necessary to account for uncertainty over the future. In particular, I account for differences in the informedness of probabilities describing future uncertainty. Probabilities can be objective like for the toss of a coin or the spin of a roulette wheel. But probabilities can also derive from a small number of observations (or simulations) or base on the principle of insufficient reason. The latter principle states that if e.g. two events are possible and an agent has no information about their likelihood, the agent should assign equal probability to both events. Qualitatively, these settings differ in their uncertainty, even when assigning the same probabilities. Examples for lacking confidence in probabilistic descriptions of long-term future economic development include the possibility of fattails in distributions governing stock markets or, in the context of climate change, the temperature response to greenhouse gas emissions and their GDP feedback. Similarly, probability distributions governing political stability are often not objective or known with confidence.
I employ a preference representation that allows the agent to distinguish different 1 Here, α is a curve determining the consumption change in the present period. Similarly u ′ (x 1 ) will be short for ∂ β 1 u(x 1 ) denoting changes along curve β in period 1, and u ′ (x T ) will be short for
types of probabilities by means of a degree of confidence (or subjectivity). Traeger (2010) derives an according preference representation by enriching the well known von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) framework for decision making under uncertainty with a dimension of confidence. Special cases of the model disentangle Arrow Pratt risk aversion from intertemporal substitution like in Epstein & Zin (1989) , Weil (1990) , and Kreps & Porteus (1978) [KP-model] , or represent smooth ambiguity aversion as in Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Klibanoff et al. (2009) 
The representation builds on a set of increasing functions {f s } s∈S that characterize a measure of intertemporal risk aversion. Each index s ∈ S corresponds to a particular degree of confidence (or subjectivity), complementing the probabilistic measure of uncertainty. The set S is an arbitrary finite set of confidence descriptions. Throughout the paper I assume that utility u and the risk aversion functions f s are increasing and concave. In the case of two periods and a single lottery over future consumption, which is characterized by the probability measure p of degree of subjectivity s, the welfare evaluation writes as
where the superindex " −1 " denotes the inverse and "•" denotes function composition.
The operator M f p ≡ f −1 E p f takes a generalized mean of whatever follows to its right.
A concave function f implies that the result of the generalized mean M f p returns a smaller value than the expected value operator itself (Hardy, Littlewood & Polya 1964) . A concave function f s characterizes intertemporal risk aversion with respect to uncertainty with degree of confidence s. A way to think about intertemporal risk aversion is as a measure of risk aversion with respect to utility gains and losses. Equation (4) will give a choice theoretic interpretation. In general, many layers of uncertainty characterized by different degrees of confidence can come together in determining future outcomes. An example of such a more general uncertainty description is depicted by the tree in Figure 1 . The representation derived by Traeger (2010) implies that a lottery of degree of subjectivity s within this uncertainty tree has to be evaluated by the generalized mean that is characterized by the intertemporal risk aversion function f s . A tree as in Figure 1 features lotteries over lotteries. I start by labeling the root lottery to the left as lottery p 1 . Lottery p 1 is a lottery over different lotteries p 2 in the next uncertainty layer. The lotteries in the last layer are lotteries over future outcomes. The uncertain scenario depicted in Figure 1 involves Collapsing the first two layers into a single layer would not change the evaluation as both layers share the same degree of subjectivity. Moreover, the degree of subjectivity s ′′′ on the degenerate node is irrelevant for the evaluation (a degenerate node expresses certainty).
four different lotteries p 3 with three different degrees of subjectivity.
2 In general, let there be N ∈ N layers of uncertainty. Moreover, letŝ(p) denote the degree of subjectivity of a given lottery. Then, the general preference representation can be written as
Intuitively, each generalized mean deducts a risk premium that depends on the amount of uncertainty (described by p i ) and on the degree of confidenceŝ(p i ). I denote certainty equivalent utility in the i-th layer by
and m N +1 (x 1 ) ≡ u(x 1 ) or, dropping the argument, simply by m i .
The following characterization of intertemporal risk aversion adapted from Traeger (2010) gives a useful intuition for the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. Let a decision maker be indifferent between the two combinations of first and second period outcomes (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 1 , x 2 ), where u(x 1 ) > u(x 1 ) and u(x 2 ) > u(x 2 ). An intertemporal risk averse decision maker prefers the certain consumption path (x 1 , x 2 ) (or equivalently (x 1 , x 2 )) over a lottery that yields with equal probabilities either the path (x 1 , x 2 ) or the path (x 1 , x 2 ). Formally this condition can be written as
where ⊕ 1 2 s denotes a probability one half mixture with degree of subjectivity s. If this mixture represents an objective lottery, like in the case of a coin toss, equation (4) 2 The hierarchical structure of lotteries over lotteries can be visualized by indexing a lottery in layer i with θ 1 , . . . , θ i−1 , where θ j characterizes the risk states going along with lottery p j . If the lottery p i has a continuous distribution, the uncertainty layer i + 1 features an uncountable set of lotteries p i+1 . A formal characterization of the general lottery space is given in Traeger (2010) and employs Borel measures over disjoint unions of Borel algebras corresponding to the different degrees of subjectivity.
captures intertemporal risk aversion with respect to objective lotteries. Alternatively, the lottery can depict an event with binary outcome and the complete lack of information on likelihood (principle of insufficient reason). Note that an agent described by the intertemporally additive standard model is always indifferent between the certain path and the lottery in equation (4).
It is useful to understand that, in an intertemporal setting, uncertainty affects welfare in two distinct ways. First, a stochastic variable generates fluctuations over time. A decision maker with a preference for smooth consumption paths dislikes these fluctuations. This effect of risk is captured by (interaction with) the utility function and is part of standard model. Second, a decision maker can be intrinsically risk averse (averse to risk per se). This effect is captured by intertemporal risk aversion. A different way to measure risk aversion in the general setting is as follows. Let the curvature of u continue to measure aversion to intertemporal substitution. Instead of measuring intrinsic risk aversion directly with a measure of intertemporal risk aversion, the overall risk aversion can be measured by the functions
for all s ∈ S. Both, the concavity of f s and the concavity of u translate into the curvature of the functions g s . Hence, they jointly capture both sources of risk aversion.
As discussed in Traeger (2007) and Traeger (2010) these functions g s characterize
Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to lotteries of degree of confidence s. Note that this interpretation in terms of Arrow Pratt risk aversion only holds in the onecommodity setting. Equation (5) implies a further characterization of intertemporal risk aversion. The statement that f s = g s • u −1 is concave implies that Arrow Pratt risk aversion dominates aversion to intertemporal substitution. Hence, an intertemporally risk averse agent prefers to substitute into the certain future rather than into an uncertain risk state. The assumptions that u and f s are increasing and concave imply the same characteristics also for g s .
Present versus Future
The model of this section analyzes the case where future payoffs are collected in a single uncertain future period. This is the setting of Leland (1968) , Gollier (2002) , Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) , and Traeger (2009) as well as most analytic discussions of social discounting in the integrated assessments of climate change. I introduce multiple layers of uncertainty characterized by differing degrees of confidence. The model relates to the representations of the social discount rate under KP preferences analyzed in Gollier (2002) and under smooth ambiguity KMM preferences examined in Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) . I compare, unify and generalize the results of these papers. I derive a sufficient condition under which the social discount rate decreases with uncertainty, and a sufficient condition under which for the social discount rate is smaller than in the standard model. A special case of these conditions characterizes when smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the social discount rate. The conditions depend on preferences only and hold for all uncertain scenarios (lotteries).
The social discount rate in terms of intertemporal risk aversion
The following proposition extends the expression for the social discount rate in equation (1) incorporating uncertainty and uncertainty attitude.
Proposition 1: The social discount rate under preferences of the form given in equation (3) is
The expected value operator E p i acts on everything carrying an index i + 1 for the next uncertainty layer: lotteries p i+1 and certainty equivalents m i+1 . In particular, the expected value operator printed in large also acts on the i+1 entries of the subsequent product term (with E p N acting on u ′ (x 1 )). I label the fractions with the expected value in the numerator prudence terms. The name is based on Proposition 2 below. The fractions with the expected value in the denominator are weights. These term increase the weight given to events with high marginals (generally low outcomes), and reduces the weight of events with low marginals (generally high outcomes). Therefore, these weights gain the name pessimism term as they effectively bias probabilities to give more weight to bad outcomes. Both names were assigned by Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) in a special case described below.
Proposition 2: A prudence term of confidence level s reduces the social discount rate, if and only if, the function f s exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion
Only relying on smoothness of the function f s , the condition is
f s′′ absolute intertemporal prudence with respect to confidence level s. The name prudence relates to Kimball's (1990) work on third order derivatives of utility functions in the context of precautionary savings. In this terminology the condition in Proposition 2 states that the prudence term reduces the social discount rate if prudence dominates risk aversion (for a given confidence level). The condition is equivalent to a falling degree of absolute intertemporal risk aversion AIRA S . Thus, the prudence term conforms with Leland (1968) finding in the standard model. The following intuition explains why the third order derivative or the change of risk aversion is crucial. Assume that a decision maker is less risk averse at higher welfare levels. Then, saving for the future not only increases expected future consumption, but also reduces the risk premium accounting for future uncertainty. Thus, the decision maker has an additional incentive to save for the future under uncertainty.
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Sufficient conditions for which the pessimism term decreases the social discount rate are more intricate. In a simplified version of the model, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) analyze the term. They use the KMM framework of smooth ambiguity aversion by Klibanoff et al. (2005) , which accounts for two types of lotteries: objective (s = obj) and subjective (s = subj). The decision maker exhibits intertemporal risk aversion only with respect to subjective lotteries characterized by f subj , but not with respect to objective lotteries (f obj is the identity/absent from the model). Moreover, the smooth ambiguity model assumes that the decision maker faces a subjective lottery over an objective lottery.
Corollary 1: [KMM model of smooth ambiguity aversion] In a setting with subjective over objective lotteries and intertemporal risk neutrality with respect to objective risk, the social discount rate collapses to the form
.
Here E p obj takes the expectation with respect to an objective lottery over outcomes x 1 , while E p subj takes expectations over the objective lotteries p obj (and the objective cer-
. In this framework, f subj corresponds to Klibanoff et al.'s (2005) measure of smooth ambiguity aversion. In this context, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) already derived that decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion (AIRA subj ) implies that the prudence term reduces the social discount rate. They also discuss in detail sufficient conditions for the pessimism term to decrease the social discount rate. In general, these conditions are no longer mere preference restrictions but also involve restrictions regarding the underlying lotteries. Section 3.2 discusses a different formulation of the social discount rate that avoids these complications. Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) classify the pessimism effect as newly arising in the ambiguity setting. However, the next lemma shows that the pessimism term can already arise in a pure risk setting. Assume there is a single lottery and no subjective risk or ambiguity. Then there is a unique function f characterizing intertemporal risk aversion. The setting is a special case of Kreps & Porteus (1978) and a generalization of Epstein & Zin's (1989) and Weil's (1990) model.
Corollary 2: [KP model]
In a setting with a single lottery (no distinction of confidence, no ambiguity), the social discount rate collapses to the form
Thus, already in a standard setting without ambiguity, an appropriate representation decomposes the social discount rate into a prudence and a pessimism term. The smooth ambiguity model and the KP model yield similar forms for the social discount rate. Comparing the two, the smooth ambiguity model replaces outcomes in the KP setting by conditional expectations (conditional with respect to subjective uncertainty). This similarity arises because the KP preference structure allows for intertemporal risk aversion with respect to objective risk, while the KMM model allows for intertemporal risk aversion with respect to subjective risk (and assumes neutrality with respect to objective risk). Combining the two models yields prudence and pessimism effects in both uncertainty layers.
Corollary 3: [KMM merged with KP model]
In a general setting with subjective over objective lotteries the social discount rate collapses to the form
Proposition 2 then states that the subjective prudence term reduces the social discount rate if and only if subjective prudence dominates subjective risk aversion and that the objective prudence term reduces the discount rate if and only if objective prudence dominates objective risk aversion. In the language of Leland (1968) : If both risk measures AIRA subj and AIRA obj are decreasing in their arguments, then (at least) the prudence terms reduce the social discount rate. Observe that, in the representation of this section, the arguments of the risk aversion functions f s are not physical wealth, but utility that measures outcome appreciation derived from intertemporal trade-offs.
The social discount rate in terms of Arrow Pratt risk aversion
The previous section decomposed the social discount rate into a prudence and a pessimism term. While Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) have derived this decompostion for the ambiguity setting, I have shown the analogous decomposition for the more general setting as well as for the pure risk case of Kreps & Porteus (1978) . Gollier (2002) has shown that the effect of uncertainty on the social discount rate in a KrepsPorteus framework can be unambiguously determined. His decomposition does not involve the pessimism term, whose sign generally depends on the underlying lottery. This section develops a similar representation of the social discount rate for the general model and pins down the overall effects of uncertainty on the social discount rate. The key is to use a representation that employs measures of Arrow Pratt risk aversion rather than measures of intertemporal risk aversion (or smooth ambiguity aversion). This approach is only possible in a one commodity setting and I assume that outcomes are drawn from a closed subset of IR for the remainder of this section. As discussed at the end of section 2, the functions
characterize Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to lotteries of degree of confidence s. The subsequent discounting formula builds on a preference representation that eliminates the f s function and introduces the g s measures of risk aversion instead. In this representation, certainty equivalents are measured in real terms rather than in certainty equivalent utility. I denote the i-th layer certainty equivalent by
Proposition 3: In a one commodity setting, the social discount rate of Proposition 1 is also characterized by
(combined of all levels)
Again, the expected value operator E p i acts on lotteries p i+1 and certainty equivalents n i+1 to the right, including those in the next product term. The important difference between equation (6) and (7) is that, in equation (7), the marginal utility ratio shows up on the left of the expected value operators, evaluating only the certainty equivalent n 1 . In consequence, the proof underlying Proposition 2 can be applied recursively to all Arrow Pratt prudence terms yielding the following result. Only relying on smoothness of the functions {g s } s∈S , the condition is
II) in the standard model (where g s = u ∀s ∈ S) if, in addition to the conditions stated in part I, absolute Arrow Pratt risk aversion dominates utility prudence, i.e.
Only relying on smoothness of the functions {g s } s∈S and u, the condition
In the special case of KP preferences (#S = 1), part I of the proposition was derived by Gollier (2002) . If the decision maker is more Arrow Pratt risk averse the lower his wealth, then uncertainty over his future income will induce higher savings (thereby effectively reducing risk aversion). The corresponding special case of part II where #S = 1 extends Gollier's finding by comparing the social discount rate under KP preferences to the discount rate in the standard model. In the standard model, the concavity of marginal utility is the only ingredient that reduces the social discount rate under risk. In contrast, under KP preferences the disentangled Arrow Pratt risk aversion takes this role. If this disentangled risk aversion dominates utility prudence Kreps Porteus preferences reduce the social discount rate more. In particular, a decision maker who does not exhibit utility prudence, but exhibits Arrow Pratt risk aversion, will always choose a lower discount rate under Kreps Porteus preferences. The special case of the smooth ambiguity model corresponds to S = {obj, subj} and g obj = u. The condition of smooth ambiguity aversion, i.e. that f subj is concave, translates into g subj •u −1 concave, which means that the decision maker is more averse to subjective risk than to objective risk or intertemporal substitution. Ambiguity itself relates to second order subjective uncertainty (over objective first order lotteries).
Corollary 4: [KMM model]
I) The introduction of uncertainty in terms of ambiguity and/or objective risk decreases the social discount rate if ARA subj = − g subj ′′ g subj ′ and η = − u ′′ u ′ are both decreasing or, equivalently, if
Only relying on smoothness of u and g subj , the conditions are u
concave. Translated into the f -representation of section 3.1 these conditions become u
II) In an uncertain world, the introduction of ambiguity aversion reduces the social discount rate if in addition to the conditions stated in part I subjective Arrow Pratt risk aversion ARA subj dominates utility prudence:
Only relying on smoothness of u and g subj , this additional requirement is
In the statement relating to the f -representation in part I of the corollary, the expression is a multiplication ('·') of two composed functions. The corresponding condition can be translated into a third order condition, however, the resulting expression extends over several lines and is of little insight. Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) have analyzed the questions answered in Corollary 4 in the f -representation. For general functional forms, they only found joint conditions on preferences and lotteries in order to identify when ambiguity aversion reduces the discount rate. In contrast, the above corollary holds for all well defined ambiguous lotteries. Note that the corollary also holds for the setting where the decision maker faces objective over subjective lotteries, which is not part of the KMM setting. Finally, observe that it would be misleading to interpret utility prudence in part I of Corollary 4 as a decreasing absolute aversion to intertemporal substitution. The comparison with the general result in Proposition 4 shows that aversion to intertemporal substitution only plays a role as entangled aversion to objective risk.
The multiperiod case
This section extends the discounting formula to settings with an arbitrary time horizon. In the discounted expected utility standard model the discount rate only depends on consumption and uncertainty in the investment and the payoff period. This simplification no longer holds in the current setting, or in the special cases of Kreps-Porteus or smooth ambiguity preferences. Here, uncertainty resolution between the investment and the payoff period influences the discount rate, and so does the uncertainty governing the post-payoff future. In general, Arrow Pratt prudence no longer characterizes fully the overall effect of uncertainty on the discount rate. The second part of this section derives a particularly simple discounting formula under the assumptions of normal growth rates and homothetic preferences. I discuss how the familiar Ramsey rule stated in equation 1 changes under aversion to the lack of confidence in probability estimates and a decrease of confidence in the futurity of forecasts.
The general case
Let the decision maker evaluate a project with payoffs in period T . In general, the time horizon influences the discount rate, even if it surpasses the time of the project payoffs. I assume a planning horizonT > T . 4 The social discount rate corresponds to the equilibrium interest rate on a zero coupon bond with maturity in period T . Uncertainty in period t is captured by N t layers of uncertainty. Traeger (2010) . Preferences are extended recursively to the multiperiod case. They are stationary giving rise to the existence of constant pure rate of time preference δ. If the decision maker adopts a finite planning horizonT then WT = u(xT ) captures welfare in the last period after all uncertainty resolved. If the decision maker's planning horizon coincides with the time of payoff T , then W T = u(x T ). Welfare in earlier periods is obtained by recursively calculating ). Recall that the social discount rate in the multiperiod setting was defined as the yearly average. 4 In the case of an infinite time horizon, I assume that future consumption grows sufficiently slow that the welfare functional converges. Here, welfare is generally obtained as a fix point of equation (8) under some stationarity assumption, or by explicitly spelling out the equations of motion and the formulating the Bellman equation. Assuming a positive time preference and a stationary consumption process beyond some point in timeT >T would permit the decision maker to calculate the value WT in the infinite time horizon setting and then to simply work through the relevant years of the project recursively.
5 The recursion calculates welfare at the end of a given period when uncertainty only remains about future outcomes. To obtain welfare at the onset of period t−1 simply apply
Proposition 5: The social discount rate in the multiperiod setting for payoffs in period T is
For i < N T the expected value operator E p i t acts on lotteries p i+1 t and certainty equivalents m i+1 t . The expected value operator E p N t t acts on m Nt+1 t = x t and, for t < T , on the lottery p 1 t+1 characterizing uncertainty in the next period. The form for the discount rate in Proposition 5 does not depend on whether the decision maker applies a finite planning horizon of time T , some larger finite horizon, or an infinite planning horizon. However, the evaluation of the certainty equivalent utility levels do depend on the time horizon. In the case of an infinite time horizon the m i t (p i t ) depend on an infinite consumption process. Proposition 2 also applies in the general setting.
Proposition 2': A prudence term of confidence level s reduces the social discount rate, if and only if, the function f s exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion
Only relying on smoothness of the functions {f s } s∈S , the condition is
Once more, the assumption of a one-commodity setting permits a translation of the risk aversion measures into Arrow Pratt terms by using g s = f s • u for s ∈ S. The corresponding representation of the social discount rate employs the definitions of the certainty equivalents in real terms n
Proposition 6: In a one-commodity setting, the social discount rate expressed by means of Arrow Pratt risk aversion for I) a decision maker adopting the time horizonT = T coinciding with the time of the payoff is
II) a decision maker adopting a time horizonT > T (possibly infinite) is
Note that, once more, also the evaluation of the certainty equivalents n i t depend on the time horizon. In equation (9) the use of Arrow Pratt risk aversion shifts marginal utility again to the left of the expected value operator in the respective period. In a two period setting, this shift enabled the powerful statements of Proposition 4. However, in the multiperiod setting these marginal utilities also depend on uncertainty and consumption levels in other periods. Because of this interdependence of welfare the proof underlying Proposition 4 no longer applies. Moreover, if the planning horizon exceeds that of the project, the interdependence with future welfare introduces an additional marginal utility term to the right of the last expectation operator. Assuming that uncertainty only resolves in period T =T recovers a separable welfare function and Proposition 4 applies again.
Corollary 5: [Uncertainty resolves only in period T =T ]
If the planning horizon of the agent coincides with the time of the payoffT = T and there is no uncertainty resolving in earlier periods, then Proposition 4 also holds for the multiperiod setting.
Isoelastic preferences and normal uncertainty
Isoelastic preferences are arguably the most prominent specification in economics. They imply decreasing absolute coefficients of aversion and underly the usual parametric formulation of the Ramsey discounting formula. This section extends the parametric Ramsey rule to the setting of this paper, assuming isoelastic preferences and normal growth rates. Let X ⊂ IR describe an aggregate consumption commodity. Assume that consumption growth is uncertain and described by a normal distribution. Growth from one period to the next is captured by a single uncertainty layer. The growth rate g t = ln
x t+1 xt ∼ N (µ t , σ t ; s t ) is distributed normally, where s t ∈ S labels confidence. I assume isoelastic preferences that can be represented by the functions u(x t ) = . In a setting without confidence, these preferences correspond to those used by Epstein & Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) to disentangle risk preferences from intertemporal substitutability. I employ the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution η = 1 − ρ = − u ′′ u ′ for measuring the decision maker's propensity to smooth consumption over time. Epstein & Zin (1989) measure Arrow Pratt risk aversion as a function of α only. Instead, I employ a measure proportional to the coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion
for all s ∈ S and ρ = 0 ⇔ η = 1. The absolute in the definition arises because the functions f are decreasing for ρ < 0, a case I avoided above without loss of generality.
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Note that in the Epstein-Zin specification the measure RIRA s of relative intertemporal risk aversion goes to infinity ρ → 0. I therefore introduce a renormalized measure
which is continous at η = 1 and positive if and only if the decision maker is intertemporal risk averse.
Proposition 7: The social discount rate for payoffs in period T is
The first term in the sum captures how expected growth reduces future marginal utility deriving from a unit of consumption. The second term corresponds to the risk term of the standard model. It is caused by aversion to intertemporal fluctuations generated by the stochastic process. The last term captures intertemporal risk aversion. Common values for η in the standard model are between 1 and 2. However, the as a reasonable estimate. Assuming an expected growth rate of 2%, the growth term results in the range 1.3% − 4%. Assuming a yearly standard deviation of 4%, the second term ranges in 0.04% − 0.3%, which is negligible.
7 Thus, intertemporal growth trends are highly significant for the social discount rate, while wiggles are not. Relative risk aversion, measured in the Arrow Pratt sense, generally is assumed to range 5 − 10 giving rise to ζ ∈ [7 2 /9, 15 5 /9] for η = 2 3
, ζ ∈ [8, 18] for η = 1, and ζ ∈ [9, 27] for η = 2. The last contribution in equation (11) then ranges 0.6% − 1.9%. Thus, intertemporal risk aversion reduces the social discount rate significantly, while risk has a negligible effect in the standard model.
The numerical reasoning above assumes constant growth expectations and disregards confidence. In the following, I keep µ t and σ t fix at not necessarily constant levels. I analyze the situation where confidence into the normal distributions decreases the further the agent looks into the future. I assume that the decision maker is averse to subjectivity or, equivalently, to the lack of confidence in beliefs. The formal definition of aversion to subjectivity requires a non-degenerate complete order ⊲ ⊂ S 2 on the set of degrees of subjectivity. A ranking where lotteries labeled s are considered more subjective (or less confident) then lotteries labeled s ′ is denoted s ⊲ s ′ . Following Traeger (2010) , I define a decision maker as [strictly] averse to the subjectivity of belief or the lack of confidence in beliefs if for all s, s
for all or, equivalently, some t ∈ {1, ..., T }. The equivalence of the two lines on the right hand side is shown in the cited paper. Note that the definition of smooth ambiguity aversion is a special case of aversion to the subjectivity of belief (or lack of confidence) corresponding to the case #S = 2. Finally, let
denote the space of all order preserving maps from the abstract space of confidence descriptions onto the unit interval, which map the label indicating most confidence to zero and the label indicating least confidence to unity. The following proposition expresses the social discount rate in terms of subjectivity and aversion to subjectivity (lack of confidence).
Proposition 8: Let a decision maker exhibit isoelastic preferences, intertemporal risk aversion to objective lotteries, and aversion to the lack of confidence. Let the growth rate be normally distributed as laid out above. Then there exist parameters η ∈ IR, λ ∈ [0, 1), and ζ ≥ 0 and a map S * ∈ S * such that the discount rate for a payoff in period T is
where
For a decision maker who is strictly intertemporal risk averse with respect to objective lotteries and satisfies strict aversion to the lack of confidence in beliefs it is ζ, λ > 0.
The parameter λ captures aversion to the subjectivity of belief. Assume that confidence into the normal distributions describing uncertainty decreases the further the agent looks into the future: s * t+1 > s * t ∀ t ∈ {1, ..., T }. A decision maker whose evaluation is independent of confidence (and, thus, obeys the KP model) is characterized by λ = 0. For him, the contribution of intertemporal risk aversion to the social discount rate is captured by ζ. For general decision makers, however, ζ only reflects intertemporal risk aversion to objective lotteries (ζ = ζ s ). A decision maker with strict aversion to the subjectivity of beliefs exhibits λ > 0. Such a decision maker is relatively more willing to invest into the future, in order to increase and ensure his future consumption level, than is a decision maker described by the standard model. This difference increases the further the agent looks into the future, increasing baseline consumption further in response to an increasing lack of confidence. An example is a decision maker who takes into consideration that climate change, revolutionary research, or social tensions might make future growth less (and less) predictable. Given the agent's lack of confidence in his ability to describe the future adequately, he invests more into projects with future payoffs. More likely than not, a decision maker in such a situation would not only pick s t to be increasing over time, but also σ t , both lowering the social discount rate for long-term payoffs. Note that the combination of a complete lack of confidence s t = 1 and an extreme aversion to the lack of confidence λ → 1 results in the Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) criterion for decision making under ignorance. That is, such a decision maker would only pay attention to the worst possible outcome. 
Conclusions
I derived a generalized discounting formula for a setting where a decision maker distinguishes the degree of confidence for different probabilistic descriptions of the future. As special cases I obtained the social discount rates in the smooth ambiguity model and in the setting of Kreps-Porteus (or Epstein-Zin) preferences. I have shown that a previously derived decomposition of the social discount rate under ambiguity into a prudence and a pessimism effect already obtains in the Kreps-Porteus setting with objective risk. Moreover, the ambiguity prudence effect is a special case of a prudence effect captured by intertemporal risk aversion with respect to subjective lotteries. Expressing the preference representation in terms of (generalized) Arrow Pratt risk aversion I eliminated the pessimism effect. In the two period setting, I have shown that decreasing Arrow Pratt risk aversion (for differing degrees of confidence) is a sufficient condition ensuring that general forms of uncertainty reduce the social discount rate. The intuition behind this finding is the same as already established 8 The limit λ → 1 corresponds to γ s * → ∞ for s * → 1, giving rise to full weight on the minimal element carrying positive probability mass. The normal distribution has full support on IR so that the decision maker puts all weight on however small possibility of dying of hunger (or worse). If we offer such an agent a zero coupon bond enabling a sure transfer into the future and allowing him not to worry about starvation in that period he would pay an infinite amount for the first marginal transfer. This is reflected by the discount rate going to infinity if both, λ and s, approach unity. Obviously, the underlying growth model in combination with the offer of a certain transfer would be too simple a model in order to support the decisions of such an agent. A "dismal theorem" interpretation of equation (12) would be a misinterpretation (or extrapolation beyond applicability) of the model.
by Leland (1968) . A decision maker whose risk aversion decreases in wealth has an additional incentive to increase future baseline consumption in order to reduce the harm of uncertainty. The condition is equivalent to absolute prudence dominating absolute risk aversion, both measured in Arrow Pratt terms for given confidence levels. Moreover, the social discount rate is lower than in the standard model, if in addition absolute Arrow Pratt risk aversion dominates the absolute prudence of the utility function. A special case of these findings is a sufficient condition establishing when smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the social discount rate, without restricting the domain of admissible lotteries.
I derived the parametric special case resulting from the assumptions of normally distributed growth rates and isoelastic preferences. Here, intertemporal risk aversion always reduces the discount rate. I proved a particularly convenient representation of the discount rate that employs a degree of intertemporal risk aversion with respect to objective lotteries, a normalized numerical degree of subjectivity of lotteries, and a parameter characterizing aversion to the lack of confidence in beliefs. In this setting, I discussed how the assumption that confidence decreases in futurity reduces the discount rate over time. The further the agent looks into the future and the lower his confidence, the higher is his incentive to increase baseline consumption. Many of the examples cited in the introduction exhibit long-run benefits of current actions -or long-run costs of current inaction. Here, a reduced social discount rate implies that more projects should be carried out, e.g. mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Falling confidence in futurity implies hyperbolic dicount rates reducing the extreme devaluation of long-run consequences of current action implied by exponential discounting, while maintaining standard discount rates for the short term (even for iid uncertainty). A slightly different perspective on this finding is as follows. The standard model contains the implicit assumption that long-run uncertainties are of the same type as flipping a coin. This implicit assumption can result in a bias against precautionary action ensuring future consumption levels.
and the discount rate becomes
The second version stated in the proposition is obtained by expanding numerator and denominator with E p i fŝ
Proof of Proposition 2: For two continuously differentiable functions h and f with h > 0 and f strictly monotone on a non-degenerate domain holds
Discounting and Confidence
Then with h = f ′ , noting that f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 by assumption, I find the condition
which is equivalent to AIRAŝ
Corollaries 1 -3 are immediate consequences of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Replacing the functions f s by g s = f s • u for all s ∈ S and observing that f
The required welfare changes then become ∂ x 0 u(x 0 ) = u ′ (x 0 ) and
which results in the discount rate stated in equation (7).
Proof of Proposition 4:
Part I: Let r cert denote the discount rate when receiving the expected future payoffx with certainty. Comparison with the discount rate r in the uncertain scenario yields
for all j = 1, . . . , N ′ . Recursive application of Proposition 2 for j = N, N − 1, . . . , 1 ensures that allÃ j (p j ) are larger than unity:
Thus a sufficient condition for r < r cert is
which is satisfied by the assumptions g s′ > 0 and u ′′ , g s′′ < 0 for all s ∈ S, because an increasing concave function g s makes the generalized mean smaller than the expected value.
Part II: The comparison of r w.r.t. to the discount rate r std obtained under standard preferences where g s = u ∀s ∈ S implies the condition
is the certainty equivalent calculated with u characterizing the generalized mean. The denominator in the last term of the equation does not depend on the expected value operator immediately to the left and cancels with the numerator in the preceding term, reducing the right hand side to
As shown in part I) the product term is larger than unity. Thus, a sufficient condition for r < r cert is
If u ′ is concave the condition is satisfied as u concave and g S increasing and concave for all s imply
If u ′ is convex, using concavity of u, condition (13) translates into
This condition is satisfied if all the mean values characterized by g s , s ∈ S are smaller than those characterized by u ′ , which is satisfied if g s • u ′ −1 is concave for all s ∈ S or, equivalently,
Corollary 4 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The welfare change from an infinitesimal change in current consumption still is
, while the future change becomes
Note that the only change for a longer time horizon is that the m i t are calculated for longer consumption stream. Then
Proof of Proposition 2': Same as for Proposition 2. for t ∈ 1, . . . ,T . First, observe that ∂ x 0 W 0 = u ′ (x 0 ) still holds. Moreover,
where δ i,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise and 0 i,j = 0 if i = j and 1 otherwise. The last two equations will both be used to derive two alternative formulations. The further calculation differs depending on the time horizon:
) and the last derivative cancels the last u ′ -denominator, resulting in and the discount rate becomes
where in the second line by definition n
, so that the last terms no longer cancel and by equation (14) the discount rate becomes
Note that
Proof of Corollary 5: In this case the general formula collapses to ) .
to the subjectivity of belief it also follows that ζ S * −1 (s * t ) is monotonous in s * t for all S * ∈ S * because a more subjective lottery implies a higher degree of intertemporal risk aversion (Traeger 2010) . In particular, there exists a map S * on the set of finite elements s ∈ S such that ζ 1−λs * t = ζ st .
